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This article aims to clarify how the level of defence expenditures affected security poli-
cy in the post-World War II Europe and the United States till the present day. We first 
analyze theoretically the issue of a nation’s power through its defence outlays. We 
then proceed to the examination of how security policy was formulated during Cold 
War and afterwards for both Europe and the United States through their defence ex-
penditures.  By  comparing  European  to  United  States  defence  budgets  ceilings  we 
found that the European military capabilities are undermined by the low level of the 
defence budget which is provided by the European Union member states as a whole, 
as well as by the lack of homogeneity in military means. By contrast, we noticed that 
the historically large US defence expenditures were one of the major reasons for the 
US global hegemony during Cold war and afterwards. We also examine the implica-
tions  that  defence  expenditures  have  on  military  industry,  macroeconomic  perfor-
mance and geopolitics and the correlation that arises among them. 
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Security policy is a very important factor of a nation’s strength as it determines considerably 
its political independence and social stability. Security policy is not just the implementation of 
a nation’s deterrence policy so as to protect its human capital and infrastructure but also it is 
the way of preservation and protection of a society’s values and principles by external threats 
or challenges. However, in order to be credible and plausible, security policy needs effective 
armed forces, which consequentially means that their efficiency is determined predominantly 
by the level of a nation’s defence expenditures. 
 
The need for powerful armed forces had already been noted since ancient times. Power, for 
Thucydides, is expressed through military means and measured through military capabilities.
1 
The 5
th century
 A.D. latin author Vegetius suggested to the Roman emperors “si vis pacem, 
para bellum”, which means “if you wish for peace, prepare for war”. Niccolò Machiavelli, in 
accordance with Thucydides and Vegetius proposes that force is related to military capabilities, 
while the 18
th century King of Prussia, Frederick the Great had come to the conclusion that 
“diplomacy without credible armed forces is like music without instruments.”
2 Finally, the fa-
mous Prussian General and war theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, in his  On War suggests that 
“war is merely the continuation of policy by other means”.
3 
 
The  correlation  between  security  and  military  capabilities  is  also  corroborated  by  modern 
scholars of international relations. Some examples include Edward Carr who in his  Twenty 
Years Crisis proposes that military strength plays the crucial role for the formation of interna-
tional relations, a thesis consistent with Frederic the Great’s ideas.
4 Another leading repre-
sentative of the “classical realist” school of international relationships, Hans Morgenthau, ad-
mits that military strength is the predominant (but not the only) factor for the political power 
of a nation.
5                  
 
The  major  contribution  of  our  analysis  in  this  paper  is  that  we  examine  how  defence              
expenditures  affected  security  policy  in  both  Europe  and  the  United  States.  Although              
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1.  Thucydides, Benjamin Jowett, The History of the Peloponnesian War, New York, Prometheus Books, 
1998, p. 169.  
2.  Vegetius, Michael D. Reeve, Epitoma Rei Militaris, , Oxford, Oxford Classical Texts, 2004, Book III ;  
Niccoló Machiavelli, The Prince, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 28 ; Jeremy Blackham and 
Gwyn Prins, “Why Things Don’t Happen: Silent Principles of National Security”, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 
155, No. 4, August-September, 2010, p. 21. 
3.  Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle, The Political Theory of War, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, pp. 139-144. 
4.  Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pp. 102-134. 
5.  Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, McGraw-Hil 
Humanities Social, 1993, pp. 30-34.  we  acknowledge  that  this  is  hardly  an  approach  that  fully  justifies  by  its  own  the  ways                   
which  security  policy  is  shaped  by  states  globally,  we  do  think  however  that  the  issue  of              
defence expenditures is of major importance when a state intends to implement its grand 
strategy, a major implication of which, includes its security policy. In the first chapter we fur-
ther analyze the issue of a nation’s power based on military spending. Our findings, both theo-
retical and empirical indicate that military spending can have negative or positive implications 
not only in geopolitics but also in other aspects of a nation’s grand strategy, like economic per-
formance. 
                   
In the second chapter, we show that defence expenditures had a key role for the configuration 
of post-World War II (WWII) security policy for both the European nations and the United 
States. The vacuum of power that was created by the destruction of Europe due to the Third 
Reich’s struggle for domination made Europeans desperate for a new collective system of se-
curity against a new emerging threat: Soviet expansionism. But it was obvious that a new sta-
ble and capable European security system needed credible armed forces and thus, a large 
amount of defence expenditures that Europeans could not afford to undertake only by them-
selves.                        
 
As a consequence, the intervention of the United States in Europe via NATO became a neces-
sary precondition. However, as we further show in this part of our analysis, defence outlays 
seemed not to be the only priority for the implementation of the European security policy since 
the end of the Cold War era, as EU member states were primarily get used to other aspects of 
security, such as, the institutional evolution of the European security policy in order to manipu-
late more effectively the new emerging post-Cold War issues such as, conflict prevention, hu-
manitarian missions, etc. 
 
In the third chapter we briefly analyse the implications and the motives behind US intervention 
in global affairs, focusing mainly on their European aspect. Then, we focus on the vast level of 
the American defence expenditures since 1945 to the present day that led to the creation of 
the American political and military hegemony globally. Then, in the fourth part we proceed to 
the comparison between European to American security policy mainly through the issue of 
their defence expenditures. We noticed that the European security policy is characterized by 
inefficiencies in military means due to the low level of homogeneity among the EU’s armed 
forces.  
 
We  also  found  that  the  large  amount  of  the  US  defence  expenditures  comparing  to                      
those  of  their  European  allies  produces  positive  consequences  for  the  US  defence                  
industry,  predominantly  in  aeronautics,  which  thanks  to  heavy  Research  and  Development 
(R&D)  government  funding  and  the  huge  American  defence  market,  it  achieves                              
economies  of  scale,  in  antithesis  to  the  small  EU  member  states  national  markets.                   
However,  we  finally  show  that  a  negative  side-effect  of  the  excessive  US  defence                  
expenditures  has  to  do  with  the  deterioration  of  the  economy’s  performance,  a  situation                
that  forced  the  Obama’s  Government  to  make  plans  to  reduce  the  American  defence               
budget  for  the  2011-2020  period,  especially  war  expenses  and  new  weapons                                 
procurement, a policy which diverges significantly from the ex-president Bush’s “offensive” 
Grand Strategy. 
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 The Theoretical Background of the Defense Expenditures 
As we have already said, security policy needs effective armed forces so as to be credible and 
plausible. However, we argue that military power is dependent on the level of the defence 
expenditures a nation intends to afford. At this point we should mention that we acknowledge 
that military power is not only measured by the level of defence expenditures in absolute fig-
ures, but another crucial determinant of military power has to do with the efficient manage-
ment of a nation’s budgetary resources that are channeled for defence purposes.
6 This thesis 
is also explained by Polachek and Seiglie, who argue that the efficient utilization of defence 
expenditures augments national security.
7 
 
The importance of military power (here seen through defence expenditures) is also acknowl-
edged by many modern authors too. Ray Cline presented his “Equation of Power” according to 
which, the power of a nation is determined by the sum of its economic and military strength, - 
a thesis also supported by Paul Kennedy-, as well as by the size of its population, multiplied by 
the aggregate result of its strategic goals and the will of the political leadership to implement 
the national strategy.
8 Robert Gilpin asserted that military power is strongly determined by the 
strength of a nation’s economy, by the level of its population and by technological and institu-
tional changes.
9 Kenneth Waltz agrees with the above authors and adds that except military 
capability and economic strength, the power of a nation is also based on its ability to create 
international alliances.
10     
 
John Mearsheimer, who introduced the theory of “offensive realism” argues that states in their 
struggle to ensure their survival, seek regional dominance through military strength so as “to 
be much more powerful than all the other states in the system”. Mearsheimer, like the schol-
ars above, acknowledges that power is determined by the strength of a nation’s armed forces 
and the level of its defence expenditures.
11 Finally, Liddell Hart in his Real War provides an 
“ideological”  diastasis  to  military  power.  He  argues  that  except  the  “psychological”  impact 
which has to do with “esprit de corps”, which under certain circumstances can be a great stim-
ulus to the war effort, he also acknowledges the issues of ethics to war: He argues that “the 
stimulus of a great moral impulse to action is necessary, a deep-rooted belief in the policy for 
which citizens are called to fight”.
12 
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6.  Michael Brozska presents an extended catalogue of the allocation of defence budgets that comprises 
of many different subdivisions which, apart from the procurement budget for new weaponry, also 
include payment to soldiers, military schools, hospital services to veterans, pensions etc. It is obvious 
that if a nation is not efficient in the manipulation of these subdivisions, defence expenditures in-
crease even if the quality of security they provide is not maximized in terms of efficiency. See Michael 
Brzoska, “World Military Expenditures”, in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds.), Handbook of De-
fense Economics, Amsterdam, North Holland, 1995, pp. 48-49. 
7.  Solomon W. Polachek and Carlos Seiglie, “Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic Dis-
pute”,  in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, Amsterdam, North 
Holland, 2007, p.1030. 
8.  Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift, Colorado, Westview Press, 1975, 
p. 124; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and the Fall of the Great Powers, New York, Vintage Books, 1989, p. 
439.   
9.  Robert Gilpin “The Theory of Hegemonic War”,  Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No.4, 
Spring 1988, pp. 599-605. 
10.  Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 116-128. 
11.  For the theory of “offensive realism” see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” 
W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2003. For a more recent view that correlates a nation’s power 
with military capabilities see John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US 
Power in Asia”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010a, pp. 385-388. 
12.  B.H. Liddel Hart, The Real War, Boston, New York, Little Brown and Company, 1963, pp. 51-52. 
Journal of 
Global Analysis On the other hand, many scholars have attempted to measure the relationship between de-
fence expenditures and economic performance. Since the Cold War, empirical evidence proved 
that defence expenditures have both positive and negative impact on growth. Some scholars 
claim that although defence expenditure is regarded as “unproductive expenditure” they in-
stead produce positive spin off effects on growth.
13 By contrast, other empirical studies have 
shown a negative relationship between defence outlays and growth.
14 However, the results of 
such kinds of studies depend on different chronological sample periods while some pivotal pa-
rameters such as, socio-economic structure, the type of government etc., are different from 
state to state.
15 Recent empirical studies have also confirmed the positive or the negative rela-
tionship between defence expenditures and economic growth while others found no affection 
of defence expenditures to economic growth.
16 
          
By the overall analysis we deduce that the level of defence expenditures plays a pivotal role 
for the determination of a nation’s power (here meaning power in geopolitics and foreign rela-
tions as well as macroeconomic prosperity). In the following two chapters we will show how 
defence expenditures conditioned European security since 1945 to nowadays and how the lev-
el of defence outlays contributed to the post war establishment of the American hegemony in 
geopolitics during and after Cold war. 
 
Defence Expenditures and Security Policy Decisions in Europe since 1945 to the Present 
In order to understand the post-WW2 relationship between security policy and defence ex-
penditures in Europe and the United States we must first take a brief look to the parameters 
that formulated security and peace from the Cold War era to the present. 
 
From the WEU and NATO to the CFSP 
The socioeconomic and political environment under which post-WWII Europe must made a 
new start was undeniably grim and uncertain. Europe was in a tragic condition due to the ex-
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13.  See among others, Emil Benoit, “Growth and Defense in Developing Countries”, Economic Develop-
ment and Cultural Change, Vol. 26,  No. 2, January 1978,  pp. 271-280 ; Saadet Deger and Ron Smith, 
“Military Expenditure and Growth in LDCs”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 2, June 1983, 
pp 351-352 ; Saadet Deger and  Somnath Sen, “Military Expenditure and Developing Countries”, in 
Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, Amsterdam, North Holland, 
1995, p.  279. 
14.  See among others, David Lim, “Another Look at Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries”, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1983, pp. 377-384 ; James H. Lebovic 
and Ashfaq Ishaq, “Military Burden, Security Needs, and Economic Growth in the Middle East”, Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 31, No.1, March 1987, pp. 121-123 ; Michael D. Ward and David R. Davis, 
“Sizing Up the Peace Dividend: Economic Growth and Military Spending in the United States, 1948-
1996”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, September 1992, p. 754. 
15.  Abdur R. Chowdhury, “A Causal Analysis of Defense Spending and Economic Growth”, Journal of Con-
flict  Resolution,  Vol.  35,  No.  1,  March  1991,  pp.  94-95  ;  J.  Paul  Dunne  and  Eftychia  Nikolaidou, 
“Military  Spending  and  Economic  Growth  in  Greece,  Portugal  and  Spain”,  October  2005,  http://
carecon.org.uk/DPs/0510.pdf. Accessed 31 June 2011. 
16.  See  among  others,  Christos  Kollias,  George  Manolas  and  Suzanna-Maria  Paleologou,  “Defence  Ex-
penditure and Economic Growth: A Causality Analysis” Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 26, No. 5, p. 
568  ; Uk  Heo,  “The  Relationship  Between  Defense  Spending  and  Economic  Growth  in  the  United 
States”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4, 2010, pp. 760-767. For the negative effects or the 
subliminal positive impact of defence expenditure on growth see J. Paul Dunne, “Military Spending and 
Economic Growth in Sub Saharan Africa”, School of Economics, University of the West of England, 
Bristol and SALDRU, University of Cape Town, February, February 2010, p. 10.  For the neutral rela-
tionship between defence expenditures and growth see Eric S. Lin and Hamid E. Ali, “Military Spending 
and Inequality: Panel Granger Causality Test”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 46, No. 5, September 
2009, pp. 682-683. 
Journal of  
Global Analysis tensive catastrophes in infrastructure and loss of its manpower.  Forty million soldiers and ci-
vilians died during WWII and the production stopped in many Western European countries, in 
Soviet Union and Japan.
17 Via a series of defense and military agreements Europeans attempt-
ed to create a gradual pan-European defense identity to guarantee their protection against the 
emerging Soviet threat. On 17 March 1948 Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and the UK agreed on the creation of the Western Union. Its main purpose was mutual assis-
tance between its member states in case any country of the alliance was under attack.
18 
                 
But it was obvious that against the new emerging threat, the Soviet expansionism, the Euro-
pean nations seemed too weak to undertake an effective and credible security strategy only 
by their own. John Ikenberry argues that it was the post-WWII European governments that 
actually called for the projection of the US power into Europe in order to use its dominant po-
sition to ensure the survival and the stability of their socioeconomic and political structures. 
Thus Ikenberry argues that US hegemony in Europe was largely “an empire by invitation” 
whose main purpose was to use its dominant position to guarantee an orderly and peaceful 
international system, based on economic cooperation and international trade  exchanges, a 
situation similar to  what Great Britain did in the 19
th century.
19        
 
Under those circumstances, on 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
was formed by US, Canada and their European allies with the view to defend each member 
state of the alliance mainly from the Soviet danger and to prevent any possible future German 
hegemonic aspirations. In 1952 NATO proceeded to its first enlargement by accepting both 
Greece and Turkey.
20 However, a serious dispute between USA and France was raised be-
cause of the US intention to rearm and incorporate West Germany into NATO structures as a 
means of reducing the American burden for the protection of Europe from a possible Soviet 
threat by anchoring the new federal republic to the western sphere of influence.
21   
                 
Under these circumstances, a year later than the establishment of NATO, French politicians 
came up with a new innovative idea based on the Pleven Plan which proposed the creation of 
the European Defense Community (EDC), a military pan-European organisation which it could 
mobilize an 100.000-man army comprised by military units from Belgium, France, West Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. With such a plan the new West Germany’s ar-
my would subjected to a “supranational command”.
22 The EDC treaty was signed in 27 May 
1952 by the above states but finally was rejected by the French National Assembly in August 
1954 as well as by the UK government and thus, it never came to fruition.
23    
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17.  See Robert D. Schulzinger, U.S Diplomacy Since 1900 , New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 
199-200. 
18.  Robert  E.  Hunter,  The  European  Security  and  Defense  Policy:  NATO’s  Companion  or  Competitor?  
Santa Monica, RAND Europe, National Defense Research Institute, 2000, pp. 7-9. 
19.  John Ikenberry, “Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 104,  
No. 3, Autumn, 1989,  pp. 375-391. 
20.  See Jomana Amara, “NATO Defense Expenditures: Common Goals or Diverging Interests? A Structural 
Analysis”, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 19, No.6, December 2008, pp. 450-451 ; Seth G. Jones, 
“The European Union and the Security Dilemma”, Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3 Spring 2003, p.115. 
21.  Michael Creswell, “Between the Bear and the Phoenix: The United States and the European Defense 
Community 1950-54,” Security Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4, Summer 2002, p. 90. 
22.  Ibid., 102-103. 
23.  However, US were in favour of EDC in case it could be incorporated into NATO structure as a means 
of a further integration of the European post war security system. See Ronald R. Krebs, “Exchange: A 
Debate Miscast-Or What Can We Learn From the Case of the EDC?” Security Studies Vol. 11, No. 3, 
Spring 2002, p. 192. 
Journal of 
Global Analysis It is obvious that the rejection of the Pleven Plan meant that the Europeans were not yet ma-
ture enough to accept a supranational pan-European defence organisation.
24 However, in 1955 
with the decisive intervention of the US, West Germany became a new member of both NATO 
and the Western Union which was renamed, the Western European Union (WEU).
25 Further-
more, in 1970 European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established so as to strengthen Euro-
pean political integration. However, EPC remained stagnant for the next fifteen years.
26   
                     
This stagnation must be attributed to the unwillingness of the European NATO member states 
to promote EPC as Europeans were feeling comfortable enough from the guaranteed security 
that the US via NATO provided them.  
 
Table 1: NATO Members Defence Budgets as a Percentage of the GDP, 1949-1989 
 
Source: Jens Ringsmose, “NATO Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change After the Cold War”, Contemporary 
Security Policy, Vol. 31, No. 2, August 2010, p. 322. 
 
Country   1949 - 
1954 
1955 -  
1959 
1960- 
1964 
1965- 
1969 
1970- 
1974 
1975- 
1979 
1980- 
1984 
1985-
1989 
Belgium  4.0  3.6  3.4  3.1  2.9  3.2  3.2  2.8 
Canada  5.3  5.3  3.9  2.7  2.1  2.0  2.0  2.1 
Denmark  2.5  3.0  2.8  2.7  2.2  2.3  2.4  2.0 
France  7.2  7.0  6.0  5.0  3.9  3.8  4.0  3.8 
Greece  5.7  5.1  4.1  4.2  4.7  6.8  6.6  5.8 
Italy  4.0  3.5  3.0  2.9  2.5  2.1  2.1  2.3 
Luxembourg  2.1  2.2  1.21  1.1  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.0 
Netherlands  5.1  5.1  4.4  3.8  3.1  3.1  3.0  2.8 
Norway  3.7  3.5  3.3  3.6  2.9  2.8  2.7  2.9 
Portugal  3.8  4.1  6.0  6.7  6.9  4.0  3.4  2.8 
Spain  -  -  -  -  -  -  2.3  2.2 
Turkey  4.3  3.8  3.9  3.6  3.3  4.3  3.8  3.4 
UK  8.2  7.3  6.2  5.5  5.2  5.0  5.0  4.7 
United States  8.9  8.9  8.0  8.0  6.5  4.9  5.6  6.0 
West. Germany  4.9  3.8  4.4  4.0  3.5  3.4  3.4  3.0 
Average  4.9  4.7  4.3  4.0  3.6  3.4  3.4  3.2 
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24.  A similar idea about a pan-European military defence core was also edited by the French politicians 
during the Gaullist era (1959-1969) when the so called Fouchet plan was under discussion by Europe-
ans during the 1958-63 period. This plan proposed the replacement of NATO by a pan-European mili-
tary defence core, the abolition of the Atlantic Alliance, with France to be the undisputable military and 
political leader on it. See Seth G. Jones, “The European Union and the Security Dilemma”, (note 20). 
However, as with the case of the EDC, De Gaulle’s attempt to replace the hegemonic presence of the 
US in Europe became a pipe dream since it was evident that no European nation at that time was 
eager to replace NATO’s efficient guarantee of protection for a dubious pan-European autonomous 
security alliance being guided by France. 
25.  Thomas G. Patterson, On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War, New Work, W. W. 
Norton, 1992, p. 194. 
26.  Jones, “The European Union and the Security Dilemma”, (note 20), pp. 135-138. 
Journal of  
Global Analysis As  a  consequence,  like  with  the  cases  of  EDC  in  1950-54  and  the  Fouchet  Plan  in                        
1958-1963,  they  didn’t  seem  eager  enough  to  sacrifice  neither  their  national  defence                   
strategies in favour of a supranational pan-European defence structure, nor to spend more 
money on their defence. US commitments to NATO gave their European allies the privilege to 
act more or less as “free-riders”, which means, they could have access to “consume” a prod-
uct – in our case security- in which their contribution was smaller than the American one not 
only in absolute numbers but also as a percentage of the national Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).    
 
As  Table  1  shows,  for  all  the  Cold  War  period  the  United  States  undertook  the  greatest                 
defence  burden  from  all  their  NATO  allies  ranging  from  8.9  per  cent  for  the  1949-1954                   
period  to  6  per  cent,  as  the  Cold  War  tension  was  steadily  decreasing  during  and                            
after  the  1985-1989  period.  Table  1  shows  that  except  the  United  States  and  the                         
two major military powers of Europe, France and the United Kingdom, the other European 
NATO member-states systematically spent less on their defence compared to their strong al-
lies. Their overall contribution did not exceed 3 per cent of GDP for the 1985-89 Cold War pe-
riod.
27 
 
As a result, due to the free-rider behavior through NATO, it was not until 1985 when the Euro-
pean security policy was driven to a new dynamic prospect. In that year with the Single Euro-
pean Act (SEA), European Union member states codified European Political Cooperation obvi-
ously expressing their intention to act under a more collective strategy on security issues.
28 
Finally, in 1988 a more coordinated collaboration was established between France and Germa-
ny to run in parallel with the European Monetary Union and security policy issues that drove to 
the pivotal Maastricht Treaty Agreement in 1991.          
 
By the overall analysis for the 1945-1991 period we can argue that the great deficiencies                    
in  military  terms  of  the  post  WWII  European  military  structure,  made  the  intervention                 
of  the  US  in  Europe  through  NATO  a  necessary  prerequisite.  The  guaranteed                              
protection  that  NATO  offered  to  its  European  members  made  them  less  eager  to                           
develop  an  autonomous  European  security  identity.  But  this  great  dependence  on                      
US capabilities, that mainly based on their large defence budgets, made European security 
policy more all less to be shaped according to the American Cold War military doctrines and 
political will.    
 
It  also  seems  obvious  to  us  that  the  failure  of  the  European  attempts  (primarily  French, 
through the Pleven and Fouchet plans) for the creation of an autonomous European security 
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27.  See Jens Ringsmose, “NATO Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change After the Cold War”, Con-
temporary Security Policy, Vol. 31, No. 2, August 2010, pp. 321-323. Kollias, Manolas and Paleologou, 
“Defence Expenditure and Economic Growth” (note16), p. 555 verify Ringmose’s estimations as they 
show that the defence burden of the EU-15 member states was 2.9 per cent of GDP during  1985-
1989 period. Slightly different figures are given by Paul Dunne. According to him, during 1985-89, the 
last period of the Cold War, the US were spending 6.3 per cent of their GDP for defence although its 
NATO European allies were spending as a whole 3.3 per cent of their GDP, which is slightly more than 
the half of the American defense budget. See Paul Dunne, “The Defense Industrial Base”, in Keith 
Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds), Handbook of Defense Economics Amsterdam: North Holland, 1995, 
pp. 411-414. 
28.  Stephanie  S. Anderson and Thomas R. Seitz, “European Security and Defense Policy  Demystified, 
Nation-Building and Identity in the European Union”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 33, No. 1, Octo-
ber 2006, pp. 27-28. 
Journal of 
Global Analysis structure, even in a form of a replacement of NATO, means that Europe’s room for maneuver 
in a US dominated world was very narrow. We finally show that one major reason for this, was 
the inability of the Europeans to improve their deterrence capabilities through military means 
due to their comparatively lower to the US defence expenditures as a means of “power exten-
sion”. 
 
Towards the Post-Cold War Institutional Evolution of the ESDP 
With the end of the Cold War era Europeans decided that “the time for Europe had come”. 
Thus, with the Maastricht Treaty (signed on 7 February 1992) the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) was renamed the European Union (EU) which meant that Europeans viewed the 
EU not only as an organism for economic growth but also as a union for further political and 
institutional integration. Furthermore, on 5  November 1993, France, Germany  and Belgium 
created the “Eurocorps” that comprised military units of these three states. Eurocorps principal 
aim was to take part in the so called “Petersberg missions” such as rescue, peacekeeping and 
disarmament.
29           
 
However,  the  optimistic  views  about  a  more  prosperous  post  war  security  environment                  
were  put  into  question  due  to  the  low  efficiency  of  the  European  Security  mechanisms                       
to  prevent  conflict  or  at  least,  to  alleviate  the  negative  impact  of  the  numerous                               
war  atrocities  and  crimes  against  humanity,  like  the  civil  wars  in  Somalia  1992-93,                         
in  Bosnia  1992-95,  a  war  within  the  European  continent,  or  the  genocide  of  Rwanda                          
in  1994.  Even  during  the  Kosovo  crisis  most  EU  members  of  NATO  conceded                                   
that  they  still  lacked  in  military  infrastructure  intended  for  crisis  management                                
operations.
30             
 
But  according  to  our  view,  the  inabilities  of  the  EU  member  states  to  respond  effectively          
in those cases made also obvious the changing nature of military power itself that shifted from 
a  perception  of  a  pure  military  prevalence  in  the  battlefield  during  Cold  War,  to  a  more                 
complex set of parameters, like humanitarian and peacekeeping missions that included and 
made  necessary  the  establishment  of  a  more  coordinated  framework  for  collaboration                   
among the EU members that simultaneously were members of both NATO and the WEU. Thus, 
the  above  incidents  made  the  establishment  of  the  European  Security  and  Defence  Policy 
(ESDP) in 1999, a necessary prerequisite with the view to reform and improve military capabil-
ities among European Union member states and to enhance European security policy integra-
tion.
31                        
 
But although EU member states proceeded to the gradual institutional evolution of ESDP by 
creating new institutions such as, the European Rapid Reaction Force, the EU Battlegroups 
(BG’s), the Political and Security Committee, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), 
the European Satellite Center, the Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en matiere d’Arme-
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29.  See Jonathan Clarke, “The Eurocorps: A Fresh Start in Europe” Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, 
No. 21 December  1992, pp. 2-6, in http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb021.pdf. Accessed in 15 
March, 2012. 
30.  Anderson and Seitz, “European Security and Defense Policy Demystified” (note 28). 
31.  Christopher Reynolds, “Military Capability Development in the ESDP: Towards Effective Governance?” 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 28, No. 2, August 2007, p. 357. 
Journal of  
Global Analysis ment (OCCAR) and the European Defence Agency (EDA), their military potential remained low 
for two key reasons:
32       
 
Firstly, because EU member states political will to make these institutions functional was not 
enough and secondly, due to the major reduction of the EU member states defence expendi-
tures as a consequence of the end of the Cold War era. According to estimations, EU defence 
expenditures as a whole did not exceed 2.1 per cent of GDP for the whole 1990-1999 post-
Cold War period and remained low for all the 2000-2010 period too. European NATO members 
defence outlays as a whole did not exceed 1.7 per cent of the GDP for the year 2008 compar-
ing to the 4 per cent of GDP of the US.
33 Thirdly, the EU low defence budget resulted to major 
shortages in equipment in sectors such as aerial transportation, telecommunications, satellite 
systems and C4I.
34              
 
However, it seems optimistic the fact that as a result of all these prodigal agreements for the 
institutional integration of EU military capabilities since December 2003, EU has successfully 
launched 19 peacekeeping operations. In 2010 EU was the second largest provider in peace-
keeping missions running 12 from a total of 52 (whereas United Nations were conducting 20 
and NATO 3) with 4606 deployed staff.
35 It is also estimated that a series of significant deliv-
eries in military equipment which are on schedule for the 2008-2013 period, like the pan-
European strategic transportation aircraft, the A400M, the UK’s new communication satellite 
system, the Skynet 5, and the introduction of the pan-European navigation satellite system, 
will dramatically increase EU’s military capabilities.
36 
 
First Conclusions 
In this part of the analysis it became obvious that during the Cold War era European security 
policy was absolutely dependent on NATO, being focused on the effective treatment of the 
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32.  The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), set in 1999, was an ambitious plan, mainly pushed by the 
French in the early stages of ESDP, according to which, ERRF could be able within 60 days to deploy 
50.000-60000  troops  capable  of  handling  effectively  crisis  management  operations  and  sustaining 
peace keeping missions, the so called “Petersberg Tasks” for a year. See Hunter, The European Secu-
rity and Defense Policy, (note 18)  However, the whole concept did not materialize in its original guise 
mainly because member states were finally unable to provide the required number of troops according 
to the plans, as well as to respond in critical issues like, where these troops could be equipped, sup-
plied, deployed, rotated etc. However, the failed attempt for ERRF seems to have been compensated 
by the 2004’s EU member-states agreement for the establishment of the EU Battlegroups. This was a, 
primarily anglo-german, plan under which rapidly deployed European forces, could perform  –even 
autonomously  to  NATO-  peacekeeping  missions  internationally.  However  EU  Battlegroups  haven’t 
deployed somewhere so far. See Claudia Major and Christian Molling, “EU Battlegroups: What Contri-
bution to European Defense?” SWP Research Paper, RP 8, German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs June, 2011. OCCAR is an armament’s agency created in 1996, involving France, Ger-
many, Italy and the UK while the EDA’s main purpose like OCCAR is to enforce European defense 
industry integration and to contribute in bolstering EU military capabilities. See Frank Slijper, “The 
Emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex Arms Industry Lobbying in Brussels,” TNI Briefing Series No. 
2005/1, Transnational Institute, May 2005, and Keith Hartley, “The Future of the European Defence 
Policy: An Economic Perspective”, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 14, No. 2, April 2003, p.107. 
33.  Fabio Liberti, “Defence Spending in Europe: Can We Do Better Without Spending More?”, Policy Paper 
No. 46, Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS).  2011, p.16.  
34.  Kristin  Archick  and  Paul  Gallis,  “NATO  and  the European  Union”,  Congressional  Research  Service, 
January  2005, pp. 13-15. 
35.  Peacekeeping missions under the auspice of EU have been launched in FYROM (Operation Concordia), 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  (Operation  Althea),  Kosovo,  Congo  (Operation  Artemis),  Somalia,  Georgia  and 
Chad etc. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2009 Sum-
mary: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2009, 6-
7. 
36.  Barry R. Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?”, Security 
Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, April–June 2006, p. 180. 
Journal of 
Global Analysis Soviet threat. During the 1992-2010 period European leaders decided the establishment of a 
series of new institutions to promote the further evolution of the ESDP, such as the Battle-
groups, OCCAR and EDA.
37 But as EU member states are still keep their defence expenditures 
very law, they face major shortages in equipment and thus, European security policy is still 
dependant on NATO in infrastructure in some crucial aspects like aerial transportation, so as to 
accomplish a variety of its humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.   
 
US Security Policy: From the Cold War Era towards the 21
st century 
With the end of WWII the US became the only western military power able to defend effec-
tively the so called “free world” from the Soviet “iron curtain”. However, before any interven-
tion to Europe, United States tried during 1945-50 period to establish a postwar liberal multi-
lateral system for economic cooperation among nations that could be based on international 
trade and free market economy as its centerpiece. The main American grand strategy objec-
tive behind this was the reconstruction of the world economy with the US, being a global lead-
er,  a  “liberal  hegemon”.
38  Under  this  concept,  the  GATT  and  the  WTO,  as  well  as  APEC, 
NAFTA, and the OECD, which came as a result of the Bretton-Woods agreements, can be seen 
as mechanisms for achieving these goals. So, when post WWII Europe is concerned, it seems 
that the major goal for the US policymakers was to establish a strong and economically inte-
grated Europe being able to stand on its own in global affairs.
39 
 
The Price for American Global Hegemony 
 
A basic prerequisite for the implementation of such a plan was an economic aid package for 
the recovery of the European ravaged economies.
40 Thus, via the Marshall Plan, during 1948-
1951 the US transferred approximately 13.2 billion dollars for the recovery of the European 
economies from which 3.2 billion were distributed to the UK, 2.7 to France, 1.5 to Italy and 
1.4 to West Germany. Thanks to the Marshall Plan, most western European nations achieved 
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37.  In this point we have to acknowledge that a more integrated analysis on European security policy 
must have also included issues like the role of Turkey and the Cyprus question and its impact on closer 
cooperation between the EU and NATO. Also, we could provide a more extensive analysis on the at-
tempts by the EU to become autonomous by the US. However, such issues need an extensive analysis 
through a variety of different sub-cases, something we think that it could make our analysis to diverge 
from its main goal, which is the interpretation of EU Security policy through their defence expendi-
tures. 
38.  See G. John Ikenberry, G.J. “America’s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the 
Post-war era”, in M. Cox, G.J. Ikenberry, and T. Inoguchi (eds), American Democracy Promotion: Im-
pulses, Strategies, and Impacts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 103–126. 
39.  See G. John Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World Order in Transition” Inter-
national Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 5, 2005, pp. 133–152. GATT is the acronym for the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, WTO for World Trade Organization, APEC for Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation, NAFTA for North American Free Trade Agreement and OECD for the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. For the motives behind American intervention to Europe see 
also  Robert  J.  Art,  “The  United  States,  The  Balance  of  Power,  and  World  War  II:  Was  Spykman 
Right”?, Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, July–September 2005, pp. 368-373. 
40.  Under this perspective, it is easy to understand why United States fully supported the post WWII early 
European attempts for promoting European economic and political integration. It seems that the at-
tempts which led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 through the persistency of great visionaries, such as 
Jean Monnet, were based on the wise strategy that through economic collaboration, the gradual politi-
cal integration and unification of Europe could be achieved. It also seems that the founders of the 
ECSC and EEC used the economic integration “as a means of promoting their political interests by 
other means” if we interpret their policies through Carl Von Clausewitz’s views presented in his On 
War. See Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle, (note. 3). 
Journal of  
Global Analysis rapid economic growth by wiping out the negative effects of WWII’s resulting economic reces-
sion.
41 
       
However, the American plan for a liberal hegemony in Europe at least in its first post war 
years failed because of the extensive deregulation of the European socioeconomic order that 
caused during WWII.
42 Moreover, major defence weaknesses of states throughout western 
Europe and Japan convinced US policymakers in the latest years of 1940s that their contribu-
tion to their defence against the Soviet rising tide was bounded.
43 But the adoption of the  
Truman doctrine under which US extended their geopolitical intervention globally
44 was ac-
companied by a large increase of the US military expenditures so as to protect their allies 
against the Soviet expansionism.  
 
The US spent 12.4 billion dollars for the economic support of Europe though the Marshall Plan, 
69.5 for the Korean War, 22.3 for their commitments to NATO, 172.2 for the war in Vietnam 
and the total US economic and military aid to allied nations came up to 382 billion dollars for 
the 1946-1987 period. In addition, the World Bank which was heavily funded by the US, subsi-
dized those nations friendly to the US with the large number of 273 billion during the Cold War 
era.
45 As figure 1 shows, during the 1947-1989 period the economic price for the American 
defence expenditures globally, was particularly high, especially during war periods.  
               
Furthermore, during the 1980s the intention of the US president Ronald Reagan to launch an 
antiballistic protection system against the Soviet nuclear ballistic missile capabilities, caused a 
new arms race between USA and the USSR, most known as “Star Wars” that precipitated the 
collapse of the Soviet Union mainly due to its poor economic performance and thus, entailed 
the end of the Cold War.
46 As we have shown previously, during 1985-1989, the last period of 
the Cold War, the US were spending 6.3 per cent of their GDP for defence although its NATO 
European allies were spending as a whole approximately 3.0 per cent, which is slightly more 
than half of the American defence budget.  
 
By the overall analysis of this part of the paper we are driven to a major assumption relative 
to the thesis of our case study: That the theoretical correlation between geopolitical power 
and military expenditures we presented in the first chapter finds its verification with the US 
Cold war geopolitical hegemony. However, the price for the US military dominance was eco-
nomically speaking, detrimental. As a result of the arms race between the USA and the USSR, 
the US macroeconomic figures deteriorated and it gradually became one of the greatest debt-
or nations. This situation was interpreted by some scholars as an “erosion of American Pow-
er”.
47 
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41.  For the positive impact that the Marshall plan had on post WWII European economic growth see 
Βranford De Long and Βarry Eichengreen, “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural 
Adjustment  Program”,  Working  Paper  No.  3899,  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  October 
1991. 
42.  John Ikenberry, “Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony”, (note 19), p. 385. 
43.  Benjamin O. Fordham, “Domestic Politics, International Pressure and the Allocation of American Cold 
War Military Spending”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 64, No. 1, February 2002,  pp. 66-67. 
44.  See Michael Cox, “From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Détente: The Rise and the 
Fall of the Cold War”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No.1, February 1990, pp. 25-31. 
45.  Patterson, On Every Front, (note 25), p192. 
46.  Peter Wallensteen, “American-Soviet Détente: What Went Wrong?”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 
22, No. 1, March 1985, pp. 1-8.   
47.  See Kennedy, The Rise and the Fall, (note 8), pp. 432-437 ; Patterson, On Every Front, (note 25), pp. 
189-220. 
Journal of 
Global Analysis Figure 1: Funding of the US Defence Expenditures During 1946-2011 Period in Billions of  FY2011 Dollars 
and as a Percentage of the  Nominal GDP 
Source: Todd Harrison, “Analysis of the Fiscal Year 2011 Defence Budget Request”, Center for Strategic and Budget-
ary Assessments, 2010, p. 13. 
 
From the Pax Americana to 11 September 2001 and the “War on Terror” 
The collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991 created a new unipolar security system with the US 
remaining the only global superpower. The post-Cold war trend for global disarmament affect-
ed the US too. US defence expenditures reduced from 503.6 billion dollars on average during 
1981-1990, the last period of Cold war, to 392.8 during 1991-2000 but after the 2001 terrorist 
attacks they increased steadily to 579.6 for the 2001-2009 period.
48 
 
US continued to preserve their military presence in allied territories globally and in some cases 
they were forced under specific circumstances to display their huge military strength, like in 
Iraq in 1991, and in the 1999 Kosovo crisis, as well as to be engaged in humanitarian missions 
like in Somalia, in 1994, a fact that also approves the changing nature of military power itself, 
which is not determined only by military capabilities and strength. Not only NATO did not dis-
embodied but also expanded through two main enlargements in 1999 (Poland, Czech Republic 
and Hungary) and in 2004 (with ex-Soviet satellites Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and also Roma-
nia, Slovenia and Slovakia).
49   
 
However, the trend to reduce defence budgets terminated abruptly due to the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attacks mainly in New York which caused the death of 3000 civilians. These ter-
rorist  attacks  entailed  the  replacement  of  Cold  War  strategies  like  “containment”  and 
“deterrence” with the doctrine of “preemptive action” against terrorism.
50 
 
As Figure 2 presents, after the strike the US government undertook a new “crusade against 
terrorism” that caused their defence expenditures during the 2000-2009 period to skyrocket. 
The US defence budget as a percentage of the annual GDP jumped from 3.1 to 4.9 per cent of 
GDP for the 2000-2009 period, an increase at about 60 per cent.
51 After 9/11, the US govern-
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48.  The figures we provide here are based on annual defence budget data provided by Sharp T. (2009). 
“Fiscal Year 2010 Pentagon Defense Spending Request: February “Topline”, The Centre for Arms Con-
trol and non-Proliferation, pp. 4, 12. 
49.  Amara, “NATO Defense Expenditures,” (note 20), p. 449. 
50.  Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy After 9/11” Contemporary 
Security Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2008, p. 229.  
51.  The Military Balance, North America, London, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2010, pp. 22-23. The 
major increase in military spending for the same period is also verified by other reliable sources too: 
See Travis Sharp, “Fiscal Year 2010” (note 48), pp.  4-12 and, SIPRI Yearbook 2009 (note 35), pp.  6-
7. 
Journal of  
Global Analysis ment launched a campaign against Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003) and some other anti-
terrorist operations that burdened the US defence budget with a further 1.024 trillion dollars 
during the 2001-2010 period.
52 
 
 
Figure 2: US Defence Expenditures During 2000 - 2009 Period (in Billion Dollars) 
 
Source: Steven M. Kosiak, “US Defence Budget Options and Choices for the Long Haul”, Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, 2008, p. 7. 
 
 
Comparing  European  to  American  Defence  Strategy  Through  the  Issue of their  
Defence Expenditures 
As far as the military capability is concerned measured here by the level of defence outlays, 
US defence expenditures for the fiscal year 2011 rose to 712 billion dollars, a figure which is 
equivalent to 22 per cent of the total national budget and to 4.8 per cent of GDP.
53 Table 2 
presents the 10 larger defence spenders globally (in billion dollars) for 2010 from which it can 
be easily understood why the US still preserves their military supremacy in the 21
st century: 
According to the table, the United States spent 698 billion dollars for defence in 2010, a num-
ber which is much higher compared to China in second place (119 billion) and United Kingdom 
(59.6 billion) in the third.
54 
 
The rest of the European and Asian nations like the France and Saudi Arabia had substantially 
lower defence outlays compared to those of the US. The United States were responsible for 43 
per cent of global defence outlays for 2010 compared to 22 per cent for the European Union 
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52.  The Military Balance, (note 51), p. 24. See also Daniel Masters and Robert M. Alexander, “Prospecting 
for War: 9/11 and Selling the Iraq Warp”, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 29, No. 3, December 
2008, p. 436. 
53.  Todd Harrison, “Analysis of the Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request“, Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, 2010, pp. 1-5. 
54.  See http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A. 
Journal of 
Global Analysis nations together.
55 In addition, the recent level of European defence expenditures as a whole 
summed approximately 1.7 per cent of GDP on average, which was less than half of the Amer-
ican number (4 per cent of GDP).
56 This unwillingness by the EU to spend more on their de-
fence can be explained by the “Theory of Alliances” first introduced by Olson and Zeckhauser. 
According to their empirical study about NATO members, they found that within an Alliance, 
larger industrialized nations bear disproportionate shares of defence burden compared to their 
less developed and smaller allies.
57 
 
 
Table 2: The First 10 Military Spenders in the World in 2010 (in billion Dollars) 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2011 Summary: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm Internation-
al Peace Research Institute, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 
We believe that the reasons for European nation’s denial to share greater defence burden 
within NATO can be ascribed mainly to the end of the Cold War as well as to the changing 
nature of military power which tends to focus on humanitarian missions and conflict preven-
tion. Other reasons may include the austere measures of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact 
which does not allow extraordinary fiscal expenses and the EU’s commitments for the econom-
ic support of Eastern European states, like Poland.
58 Finally, the demographic crisis in Europe, 
that according to some estimations, may escalate approximately in the 2035-50 period will 
potentially cause problems to pension and social security systems, which means that it will 
further squeeze the European defence budgets. 
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55.  Sharp “Fiscal Year 2010” (note 48), pp. 8-10. See, also The Military Balance, (note 51), pp. 462-472.   
56.  See Table II on Christos Kollias, “A preliminary Investigation of the Burden Sharing Aspects of a Euro-
pean Union Common Defense Policy”, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 19, No. 4, August 2008, pp. 
256. 
57.  Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, An Economic Theory of Alliances, Santa Monica, California, The 
RAND Corporation, 1966, pp. 1-3,  35-37. 
58.  For the European Stability and Growth Pact see Anthony Annett, et al., “Reforming the Stability and 
Growth Pact”, International Monetary Fund, February 2005, pp. 2-5.  For the EU commitments about 
the economic support of eastern European states see Mike Artis and Frederick Nilson, The Economics 
of the European Union, Policy and Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 85-94. 
Journal of  
Global Analysis 
Rank  Country  Spending  World 
1  United States:  698  43 
2  China:  [119]  [7.3] 
3  United Kingdom:  59.6  3.7 
4  France:  59.3  3.6 
5  Russia:  [58.7]  [3.6] 
6  Japan  54.5  3.3 
7  Saudi Arabia:  45.2  2.7 
8  Germany:  [45.6]  [3.0] 
9  India  41.3  2.5 
10  Italy  [37.0]  [2.3] 
           
World Total:  1630    
[ ] = SIPRI estimate       But except for the reductions on defence spending due to the above reasons, another aspect 
that undermines European security policy compared to the US has to do with the structure of 
European defence itself, which is characterized by inefficiencies that inhibit its effectiveness 
compared to the US. EU Member States’ armed forces use a variety of different types of wea-
ponry that cause inefficiencies in combat terms and waste of money that increase the average 
cost of their maintenance.
59   
 
By contrast, the US armed forces are characterized by homogeneity in military means in  a 
sense that they use, in most cases, only a single type of weaponry for every kind of mission 
(for example M1 tanks instead of the variety of types of tanks used by Europeans, such as 
Leopards, Leclerc’s, E2 Challengers, and even the older, M48’s, T72’s etc). This reality makes 
US armed forces more efficient than those of their European NATO allies, in terms of military 
performance. In this context it is also worthy to mention that the US armed forces personnel 
during 1990 were as high as 2,117,900 (with 1,613,600 as ready reserves) while 20 years lat-
er this ceiling had drastically cut down to 1,580,255 for active personnel (with 864,547 as 
ready reserves).
60 
 
Reductions on US military personnel was the result of the post-Cold war changing nature of 
conflict. The need for armed forces able to respond in new kinds of threats such as asymmet-
ric warfare, civil wars, insurrections, transnational terrorism, and rogue nations, or to effec-
tively perform peacekeeping and conflict prevention missions, made a large amount of the 
conventional type of Cold war weaponry, like M1 tanks, unable to respond in these new kinds 
of challenges.
61 Transformations in the structure of armed forces were also adopted by the EU 
member states. Since the end of Cold War, emphasis was given in substantial troop reduc-
tions, to smaller and more expeditionary-capable forces, to fewer units of more advanced and 
more  expensive  equipment,  to  a  further  increase  pressure  towards  collaboration  when  it 
comes to the European defense industry and in short, replacing quantity with quality.
62 
 
It seems that the major priority of the American and European post-Cold War military doc-
trines was to develop and use more sophisticated capital intensive weaponry, like stand-off 
cruise missiles, telescopic satellites, C4I etc, instead of the labour intensive structure of armed 
forces during Cold war.  For instance,  from the 693 billion dollars of the  2008 US defence 
budget, 139.033 were distributed among military personnel, 165.006 billion for procurement 
of new weaponry, 256.223 billion for military operations and maintenance, and 79.567 for Re-
search and Development etc.
63 
 
This means that the amount of money that the US spends on personnel is analogous to 20 
percent, or otherwise, to the one fifth of their total defence budget. This figure is lower than 
those of their EU counterparts. While European defense budgets declined, from 255 billion 
euros in 2001 to 223 billion in 2008, (a negative compound annual growth rate of 1.9 percent) 
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59.  Keith Hartley, “Industrial Policies in the Defense Sector”, in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds.), 
Handbook of Defense Economics, Amsterdam, North Holland, 1995, p. 462. 
60.  For  this  figures  and  other  relative  issues  see  The  Military  Balance,  The  United  States,  London, 
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 1990, pp. 12-27 ; The Military Balance, 2010 (note 51), pp.  15-52. 
61.  Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, “Defense in a Globalized World: An Introduction,” in Handbook of 
Defense Economics (eds). Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, Amsterdam, North Holland, 2007, p. 618. 
62.  Hofbauer et al. “European Defense Trends, Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010, pp. 3-11. 
63.  See The Military Balance, 2010 (note 51), pp. 103-210. 
Journal of 
Global Analysis defense budget intended for personnel increased from 74,000 euros in 2001 to 92,000 in 2008 
(a compound annual growth rate of 3.1 percent). Figures for 2008 mean that 54 percent of 
the total European defense spending allocated for military personnel whereas, only 20 percent 
of the defense budgets spent on equipment (including research and development for major 
equipment programs).
64 
 
Positive Spin-Off Effects for the Defence Industry 
As many scholars argue, another aspect of the colossal annual US defence expenditures is the 
positive spin-off effects that they produce for the American defence industry and economy in 
general. Table 3 refers to a very characteristic branch of the defence industry, that of fighter 
aircrafts. It presents Research and Development (R&D) fighter costs and the total production 
number which includes national orders and exports.  
 
Table 3 proves that the American aircraft industry can cover the R&D costs and make profit 
mainly due to the huge American internal defence market which is protected by foreign com-
petitors thanks to American legislation. By contrast, European national industries cannot ab-
sorb the R&D cost and make reasonable profit because of the small orders they receive from 
the EU member states armed forces, a case that causes non-sufficient revenues for the Euro-
pean military industry. This obviously makes European fighter jets more expensive and conse-
quently, less competitive to their American rivals in international markets.
65 So, the major ad-
vantage of the US defence firms is that they achieve economies of scale due to the large num-
ber of orders mainly made by US armed forces.
66 
 
For instance, the proposed new US made 5
th generation F35 stealth fighter will receive 2.443 
orders from the US Air Force, US Navy and the Marines and is going to be developed mainly 
by one company, the Lockheed-Martin.
67 Thus, it will probably achieve economies of scale. 
This tremendous number excludes orders from US allies estimated at about 700.
68 This means 
a further increasing in the ceiling of the imminent orders to at least 3.173 aircrafts.
69 On the 
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64.  Hofbauer et al. “European Defense Trends” (note 62), p. 4. 
65.  Except perhaps BAE Systems, which had the second largest amount of arms sales in the world in 2009 
with revenues as high as 33.250 million dollars, (with Lockheed-Martin being the first having achieved  
33.430) and a very good position in arms sales within the US market. See Stockholm International 
Peace  Research  Institute  (SIPRI),  SIPRI  Yearbook  2011  Summary:  Armaments,  Disarmament  and 
International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press 20011, p. 10. 
66.  However, we have to admit that on August 21, 2011, the EU Defence and Security Procurement Di-
rective 2009/81/EC was signed. We consider it as a very hopeful prospective for the further integration 
of the European defence industry. This directive aims to facilitate the development of an EU defence 
equipment market that will increase industrial competition, reduce duplication and lower prices by 
creating an official framework for cross-border defence procurement within the EU. Thus, this directive 
revisits Article 346 of the Lisbon Treaty which was in favour of the further protection of the national 
EU defiance industries.  See Jay Edwards “The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive: A Step 
Towards Affordability?, International Security Programme Paper ISP PP 2011/05, 2011, p. 2-3. 
67.   Jonathan D. Caverley, “United States Hegemony and the New Economics of Defense”, Security Stud-
ies, Vol. 16, No. 4, October–December 2007, p. 607. 
68.  Among the countries that have already chosen the new stealth F35 Lightning aircraft are, the United 
Kingdom, Israel and Turkey. See Jeremiah Gertler, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Back-
ground and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, 2011, pp. 13-16. In other words, 
except the US, the F35 has been already selected by a number of nations with traditionally very pow-
erful Air Forces in terms of military efficiency. We believe that this fact is an indication that the future 
sales potential of the proposed F35 fighter globally are very hopeful.   
69.  The initial plan was to product 3002 aircrafts for US needs as shown in Table 3 with an R&D rising up 
to 10.4 billion dollars. However, due to continuous rising of R&D costs production reduced to 2443 
fighters to replace at about 1.200 F-16 fighters in 2030. (ibid, 17-19). 
Journal of  
Global Analysis contrary, the multinational pan-European fighter, the Eurofighter Typhoon (EF2000) so far has 
received only a little more than 620 orders and the industrial share between the four produc-
ing companies varies between 14-37%, which according to our point of view, is not a good 
example of cost reduction. Table 3 also shows that the R&D costs of the European EF-2000 
Typhoon collaboration program is more than twice the cost of the single R&D French Rafale B 
fighter project though their combat performance is approximately the same.
70 This means that 
European industrial collaboration projects are not always effective and financial resources for 
R&D are likely to be spoiled unproductively, as it happened with the case of the EF-2000 fight-
er aircraft.
71                  
 
 
Table 3: R&D Cost and Order Analysis for the Main Fighter Aircrafts from USA and the EU 
 
 
 
Source: Keith Hartley, “The Future of European Defence Policy: An Economic Perspective”,  Defence and Peace Eco-
nomics, Vol. 14. No.2, 2003, pp. 107-115. 
 
 
Another aspect of the American superiority on military applications is that the US government 
is heavily financing R&D on military projects that have been undertaken by American firms. 
After the Cold War, US governments and private firms, in antithesis to the rest of the world, 
increased their R&D on military applications. In 2004 the US were responsible for 70 per cent 
of the global national R&D expenditures (67.474 million dollars), followed by the EU budget as 
a whole (13.441 million), which was less than the one fifth of the US’ large number. Western 
European nations slightly started to increase their budget for R&D after 2001 in absolute num-
bers.
72 
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70.  Nickos Kyriazis and Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos, “Defense Procurement in Greece, A Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Fighters for the Hellenic Air Force”, paper presented at the 10th Annual International Con-
ference on Economics and Security, Thessaloniki, 22-24 June 2006. 
71.  Hartley, “Industrial Policies in the Defense Sector” (note 59), pp. 474- 475.  It is also estimated that in 
some cases industrial collaboration can lead to R&D cost increases as high as 140% or even 200% in 
comparison to national projects. See Keith Hartley, “The Arms Industry, Procurement and Industrial 
Policies” in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics Amsterdam, North 
Holland, 2007, p. 1173. 
72.  Ibid, pp. 1152-1155. 
Journal of 
Global Analysis 
Aircraft  Country of Origin  R&D costs 
(£ billion) 
National 
Output 
Exports  Total Numbers 
SAAB Gripen  Sweden  1.3  204  42  246 
Dassault Rafale  France  6.1  294  -  294 
EF-2000 
Typhoon 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
Italy 
Spain 
13.8  620  90  710 
JSF F35  USA  13.7  3002 
(150 for UK) 
2000 
(projected) 
5000 
(approximately) 
F16  USA  N/A  2250  1750  4000+ 
F18  USA  4.0  1363  401  1764 
F22 Raptor  USA  15.2+  295  -  295 It is obvious that R&D increases the quality of a product. That’s why it has also been found 
that American fighters are qualitatively superior to their western European competitors for the 
same generation of aircrafts.
73 So, the combination of both better quality and lower prices 
proves why the US military market was responsible for the 44% of global orders in 2008. It 
also  proves  why  seven  American  industrial  giants  like  Lockheed-Martin,  Boeing,  Northrop-
Grumman and Raytheon are among the first 10 companies of the military industry at the glob-
al level in terms of revenues classification, and why US-made military products are more pref-
erable than those of their European counterparts.
74       
 
Through the overall analysis in this part of the paper we have shown how defence expendi-
tures affect positively the American industry in terms of both quality and profit. This is con-
sistent with the findings of many scholars, we have already mentioned in the first part of our 
analysis  that  we  find  a  positive  relationship  between  defence  expenditures  and  economic 
growth. However, we acknowledge that extended defence expenditures produce a negative 
impact on economic performance too, as historical data approve.  
 
Negative Effects on the Economy:  
From the George Bush’s to Barack Obama’s Grand Strategy 
When on 20 January 2009, Barack Obama became the 44
th president of the United States, he 
at once commissioned with the issue of handling the excessive US national debt. The deterio-
ration of the American public debt caused the Obama Democratic Party government to imple-
ment a different approach not only through the manipulation of the issue of defence expendi-
tures, but also through the overall American Grand Strategy.
75 
 
According to ex-President Bush’s defence planning, military expenditures were estimated to 
rise gradually during the 2010-2020 period from 656 billion dollars in 2010 to 813 in 2020, 
whereas the proposed total US defence outlays to fulfil the needs of the “war against terror-
ism” campaigns until 2013 would have cost to the American taxpayers the astronomical num-
ber of 1.3-1.8 trillion dollars!
76 However, the Obama administration decided to alter the previ-
ous Bush’ defence policy by planning to cut down significantly US defence expenditures till 
2020. According to the new government’s planning, defence expenditures are estimated to 
rise as high as 670.6 billion dollars but with declining trend. These cuts mainly have to do with 
war assets and the further development of specific kinds of new weaponry.
77 
 
In contrast to George Bush’s administration, Barack Obama’s policymakers’ decision is to re-
duce gradually defence outlays from 4.8 to 3.1 as a percentage of GDP till 2020. This is be-
lieved to make future US governments capable of saving at about 1.5 trillion dollars so as to 
be able to further reduce a part of their future public debt.
78 Moreover, Obama’s policymakers 
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73.  Nickos Kyriazis and Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos, “Defense Procurement in Greece”, (note 71), p. 391. 
74.  See also Hartley 2007, “The arms Industry Procurement” (note 70), p. 1141. 
75.  It is estimated that Public Debt will have been increased to more than 18.25 trillion dollars by the end 
of 2021, a figure which is going to be analogous to 97 per cent of GDP. See Congressional Budget 
Office,  “Reducing  the  Deficit:  Spending  and  Revenue  Options”,  Washington  D.C.,  Congress  of  the 
United States, 2011, pp. 3-4. 
76.  The Military Balance, (note 51) p.27. 
77.  Ibid, (note 51) ; Laicie Olson, “Fiscal Year 2012: Defense Spending Request Briefing Book”, Center for 
Arms Control and Non- Proliferation, February 2011, pp. 1-12. 
78.  Brian  MacDonald,  “The  Obama  2010  Defence  Budget  Request.  Resource  document”,  July  2009.  
http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cda/uploads/cda/2009/03/4-09-obamadefencebudget2.pdf.  Accessed  20  July 
2011. 
Journal of  
Global Analysis decided to withdraw troops from Iraq by the end of December 2011 in order to reduce war 
expenses, a decision that has already been accomplished according to schedule. It is worthy 
to mention that the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns burdened the US economy with addition-
al 159.3 billion dollars just for the fiscal year 2011.
79 
 
In addition, the new US government seems so follow a different approach as far as the manip-
ulation of the Iran and North Korea cases are concerned contrary to the more “belligerent” 
policy of the previous Bush’ administration. Obama’s administration seems more willing for a 
diplomatic solution with those countries that –according to ex-President Bush’ doctrines- con-
sisted the “Axis of Evil” than to utilise the military option so as to destroy their possible nuclear 
installations. This policy of the government to more or less, settle all issues of geopolitical con-
frontation through diplomacy is also verified by the decision, on 17 September 2009, to rear-
range the terms of deployment when it comes to the highly advertised “Missile Defence Um-
brella” in Eastern Europe, after the strongly expressed concerns of Russia, a decision that is 
diametrically different to the previous Bush’ administration doctrines.
80 
 
Finally, even in the case of the recent war in Libya, the US did not decide to launch a full scale 
attack against the totalitarian regime of Muammar Gaddafi but to engage militarily only sea 
and airborne means. The fact that land troops were not deployed by the US in Libya to sup-
port the rebel troops against Gaddafi’s regime, is an indication for us that the US did not want 
to be engaged in another new economically disastrous war campaign, like Iraq. Having all the-
se facts in mind, we think that for the current US policy-makers, ideological concepts such as 
“War on Terrorism”, and “Axis of Evil” seem to have faded significantly. 
 
Seeing US security policy through Paul Kennedy’s spectacles bearing in mind his classical mas-
terpiece The Rise and the Fall of the Great Powers, we believe that the recent more moderate 
version of the US Grand Strategy launched by the Obama administration has to do with the 
erosion of the superpower’s strength due to the deceleration of their economic performance 
that was affected critically by both American defence expenditures and the 2007-2009 finan-
cial crisis. According to our view, the deterioration of the General Government Debt ratio  -
which was at about 12.3 trillion dollars for 2010, being analogous to 83.9 per cent of GDP, but 
with an increasing trend
81-makes any new full scale war campaign in countries like Iran and 
North Korea, a very complicated and uncertain issue.
82 
 
So, we think that the new established more moderate US security policy in global affairs has 
definitely to do with the deterioration of the US economic performance that makes excessive 
defence expenditures simply not feasible. 
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79.  Todd Harrison, “Analysis of the Fiscal Year 2011” (note 40), p. 1. 
80.  Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense”, Congressional Research Service, 
September 2009, p.1. 
81.  For the 2010 Gross General US Federal Debt see, Brian W. Cashell, “The Federal Government Debt: 
Its Size and Economic Significance”, Congressional Research Service, February 2010, p. 2-10. 
82.  However, we have to acknowledge that US watch very carefully the evolution of the  nuclear project 
of Iran and its denial to make the scientists of the international Atomic Energy Agency to have a full 
access on its progress so as to deter if possible, a “weaponised” version of its evolution. Recent esti-
mations show that Israel is ready to exercise the military option against Iran’s nuclear facilities wheth-
er the US or even the UK are going to participate in a raid or not. For all the military implication on an 
American strike to Iran See  Alexander Wilner and Anthony Cordesman, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic 
Competition: The Gulf Military  Balance”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 
2011, pp. 6-134. 
Journal of 
Global Analysis Concluding Comments 
The principal objective of this article is to examine how defence expenditures affected the post
-World War II security policies in both Europe and the United States. To achieve this, we first 
analyzed the theoretical background of defence expenditures as a factor that determines a 
nation’s power. Based in existing scholarship we found that there is a positive relationship be-
tween defence expenditures and geopolitical power, whereas defence expenditures affect ei-
ther negatively or positively the economy of a nation.        
 
Then, we analyzed the issue of defence expenditures with regard to the EU member states 
and the US separately. We found that during Cold war, the combination of both major military 
deficiencies and the lower defence budgets comparing to the US, made the intervention of the 
United States in Europe, a necessary prerequisite for its security policy.  Post-Cold War EU’s 
military structure is characterized by the lack of homogeneity comparing to the US, inefficien-
cies in military means, and by the unwillingness of Europeans to spent more so as to reorgan-
ize their armed forces more efficiently with the view to respond better in the challenges of the 
21
st century.                  
 
Then, we again tested the correlation between military expenditures and power potential for 
the US since 1945 to the present day. We found that our theoretical analysis that correlates 
defence expenditures and security policy is strongly verified when it comes to the post WWII 
US security policy and geostrategic potential. As many defence policy analysts believe, today 
there are very few adversaries to the US globally that either have the motives or the ability to 
challenge them militarily.
83 This American military dominance must be attributed, according to 
our findings, to the colossal amount of US defence expenditures during Cold War and after-
wards, which is the real reason why the US still keep the scepter of global geopolitical hegem-
ony.  
   
Finally, except geopolitics, we analyzed how defence expenditures indirectly affect economic 
performance. We deduced that defence expenditures have a positive impact on the American 
defence industry as they produce economies of scale due to the vast American internal de-
fence market. In contrast, the relatively small national defence markets of the EU member 
states and the inefficient industrial collaboration among them makes European military prod-
ucts more expensive and qualitatively inferior to their American counterparts. However, we 
found that a negative side-effect of the tremendous annual US defence budget has to do with 
the deterioration of the American economy’s macroeconomic performance, specifically with the 
deterioration of the public debt ratio.  We finally argued that this situation forced the Obama 
administration not only to make plans to reduce the American defence budget for 2011-2020 
period but also, in antithesis to ex-president Bush’s belligerent doctrines, to adopt a more 
moderate security policy profile. 
 
By the overall analysis we noticed that both the EU and the US face in common constrains in 
excessive military spending due to increases on their public debt that erode their economic 
performance. We also noticed the gradually changing nature of military power, which is not 
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83.  Andrew F. Krepinevich, “An Army at the Crossroads, Strategy for the Long Haul Series”, Center for 
Strategic  and  Budgetary  Assessments,  2008,  pp.1-3.  See  also  Mearsheimer,  “The  Gathering 
Storm” (note 11), p. 387. 
Journal of  
Global Analysis only based on military supremacy but also in other factors as well, such as conflict prevention, 
peacekeeping missions etc. Under these circumstances, it seems at first that the better coordi-
nation in military means for both the EU and the US through NATO on security policy issues, 
could be necessary for two pivotal reasons: Firstly, it seems that the Euro-Atlantic partnership 
has been historically critical for the establishment of a peaceful post-Cold War security envi-
ronment in Europe, as many scholars argue.
84 Secondly, collaboration through NATO could 
mean a more efficient management of the NATO members defence budgets as a whole, which 
it could lead to higher military efficiency with lower operational costs and thus, to the estab-
lishment of a  more reliable and efficientt security policy for both the EU and the US.
85 
 
In this context, it seems that some new institutional arrangements such as merging the al-
ready in existence military formations, such as the Eurocorps and the EU Battlegroups into an 
integrated and efficient pan-European military formation that will act on behalf of the EU as a 
whole could be a productive choice. This transformation must also include the European de-
fense industry that currently employs at about 750.000 personnel
86, as well as the gradual 
adoption of common military means of action by the EU member states armed forces in order 
to reduce their operational costs and achieve homogeneity in structure and thus, economies of 
scale.  
 
Finally, having in mind the previous overall analysis which is mainly based on the theoretical 
framework which we developed in the first part of our analysis about the relationship between 
geopolitical power and military strength, we acknowledge that the issue of the proposed de-
creases of the American defence expenditures during the 2010-2020 period could have a ma-
jor impact on their ability to extend their “imperial power” as a means of promoting peace, the 
rule of law, representative democracies and free markets, under a “liberal hegemony” ap-
proach, as many scholars argue.
87 
 
However, this thesis that justifies US intervention and hegemonic profile in global affairs as a 
beneficial condition for global prosperity, is rejected by other scholars such as Robert Keo-
hane, who thinks that instead of hegemony, cooperation and trust among nations could be the 
ideal situation for the post-unipolar world, while Kenneth Waltz, as we have already men-
tioned, emphasizes on effective international alliances.
88 Under this prospective, we think that 
a more “honest” and trustworthy cooperation based on the above ideas about international 
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84.  See among others, John Mearsheimer, “Why is Europe Peaceful Today?” European Political Science, 
Vol. 9. 2010b, pp. 387-389. 
85.  However, we have to acknowledge that the issue of the continuity of the transatlantic relationship 
through NATO is still open at least in theoretical perspective. For instance, many theorists believe that 
the American presence in Europe after the demise of the Cold War has no reason for continuing. Oth-
er important issues that someone must have in mind when analyzing NATO’s prospective towards the 
21
st century, may include an evaluation of  NATO’s efficiency as an organization, the possibility of an 
autonomous European military force even as a replacement of NATO, the curious tension in EU-NATO 
affairs, or the ways in which the European security policy must be revisited in case the US decide in 
the next years to give priority on their interests to the Pacific and elsewhere rather than Europe. We 
propose a further analysis of these and other related issues in a forthcoming paper. 
86.  See Herbert Wulf, “Will the European Defence Market Strengthen or Weaken the EU ’s Foreign and 
Security Policy? in Alyson JK Bailes, Sara Depauw and Tomas Baum (eds.), The EU Defence Market: 
Balancing Effectiveness with Responsibility, Drukkerij Artoos, Brussels, 2011, p. 24. 
87.  See Nial Fergusson, Colossus : The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, New York, Penguin Books, 
2005;  Jonathan Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American power and Post-
war Order, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006.  
88.  Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (note 10); Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Coopera-
tion and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005. 
Journal of 
Global Analysis trade and cooperation through coordination of interests must be cultivated between the US 
and their allies like EU, the United Kingdom, Turkey, an emerging regional power and Israel in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as with Pakistan, Japan and South Korea in south Asia and 
the Pacific and even,- a future friendly Iran as a regional actor in central Asia, etc. 
 
Such a “convergence” of interests and common objectives seems mutually fruitful if it finally 
happens, as an alternative “after hegemony” option that, as we have analyzed so far, may 
come as a consequence due to the unavoidable forthcoming US defence decreases, including 
their implications when it comes to the preservation of global order on security issues. Such an 
issue could be further analyzed in detail including a variety of aspects in a future research. 
 
However, we think that such kind of collaboration among the US and a “constellation” of stra-
tegic partners like the EU and the UK, may become feasible if it is mutually beneficial to all 
players. This means that such a relationship must seem capable enough to promote their eco-
nomic prosperity as well as to face more effectively all kinds of new post-Cold War threats, like 
global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation etc. and thus creating a more sta-
ble and prosperous global security environment.  
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